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ABSTRACT
Four years ago* the President of the United States
announced the introduction of the Planning Programming
Budgeting System (PPBS) budgeting to the entire Federal
Government. By using this method * the President hoped,
Federal administrators would be able to consider the costs,
impacts and benefits of alternative programs simultaneously,
and in doing so, make ’’more rational resource allocation.
This essay is a study of the application of the technique
to the operations of the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0)»
The study focuses on the operation of the 0E0
Management Information System (MIS), a device used to re
port the ’’results” of 0E0 disbursements, for if one is un
able to determine what progress has been made in the
achievement of objectives, how can he plan intelligently?
Evidence suggests that personnel skills and attitudes
combine to seriously hinder the application of MIS reporting
to 0E0 operations. Moreover, the information produced by
MIS gives no indication of the achievement of the broad
economic goals for which the agency was authorized by
Congress. Finally, there are political” pressures that
serve to make the development of a rational plan of ex
penditure impossible. One could say that 0E0 planners make
plans, only to be forced to abandon them.
The history of accomplishments of this agency, com
bined with evidence of the unsuccessful application of MIS
reporting techniques to its activities, suggests that the
chief value of applying PPBS to this sort of operation is
that it compels us to think about how best to accomplish the
objectives of a program that we, as citizens have authorized
and consider morally worthy of our best efforts.
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AT THE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM AT THE OEF
OP ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: THE PLANNING,
PROGRAMMING BUDGETING SYSTEM AS IT
APPLIES TO A HUMAN RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

FOREWORD
In early England, the word ""budget11 was used to
denote the "bag In which the Chancellor of the Exchequer
carried his proposals for public expenditures to Parlia
ment . It was a statement of public goals.

Our modern

budget-formulation process has become a device for
specifying the products of public disbursements. This
implies that the government seeks to meet objectives, and
that it has a system with which it -can measure its effec
tiveness in attaining them.

To relate spending to the

purposes for which our government exists is the task
Assigned to the Planning Programming Budgeting System
(PPBS) • To study the feasibility of using this technique
.for planning and evaluating expenditures is the purpose of
this essay.
In the past we have measured the results of govern
ment spending in terms of the dollar amounts of money in
vested in salaries, buildings and fixtures, while wishing
that we could do more to specify the "end products" of
expenditures.

This approach is grounded in the notion

that the sole way we have to limit the size of government
is to limit its resources, financial and physical.
Wot until 1961, when PPBS was introduced at the
1

Department of Defense, was there concern with an analysis
of what our dollars had purchased, in 'this case in terms
of a stable and effective national security.

Robert S.

McNamara and his assistants used PPBS techniques in de
fense planning simple mathematical and economic theories
to national security questions.

Moreover, they divided

the broad area of "national defense" into nine areas, such
as "continental air defense," into which all of the serv
ices would contribute men and material resources.
Central to these efforts has been the computation
of what has become known as "cost-effectiveness."

That is:

one asks whether the benefits of a particular venture out
weigh its costs, realizing of course that there are ele
ments of every decision that cannot be quantified. In ex
plaining this technique to a group of naval officers,
Alain Enthovain, a chief McNamara assistant, referred to th
decision to make the aircraft carrier TJS3 John P. Kennedy
fossil-fueled rather than nuclear-powered„ He pointed out
that naval officers would argue on largely instinctive
grounds that nuclear power is far superior to conventional
power. The cost analyst endeavors, however, to ask the
questions essential to the proper decision:
*)
better and, (2) why?

(1) how much

**Alain Enthovain, "Systems Analysis and the Navy,"
in Planning: Programming Budgeting:: A Systems Approach to

The cost analyst argu.es that in a world of limited
resources, 400 million dollars will buy one nuclear carrier
or one carrier and four destroyers conventionally-fueled.
The public servant is obligated by the enormity of the re
sources involved to quantify, as far as he is able, the
grounds for his decision, and at the Department of Defense
cost effectiveness studies have been heavily relied upon
as bases for judgements on whether to engage in procurement
of many items o
The Federal Government, in 1964, made a commitment
in many respects as important as its obligation to defend ,
the country from foreign enemies;
poverty In America*

namely to eliminate

It did so by passage of the Economic

Opportunity Act of 1964, which established the Office of
Economic Opportunity (0E0).

This is a locally-based,

.largely federally-financed'social service agency.

It was

to act through a series of Community Action Agencies (CAAs),
each of which would have centers to which poor people could
take their problems for solution.

These solutions could

vary from asking municipal agencies for help to calling
upon Washington to establish pre-packaged programs in the

Management ed. by Fremont Lyden and E. G. Miller (Chicago:
Markham Co., 1967), pp. 267-280. "Therefore it is important
to know whether by 'major increase in effectiveness1 is
meant more than. 33 percent, about 35 percent, or less than
33 percent. Because the Secretary of Defense must make the
decision in these terms, the statement ’major increase1 is
not helpful.n

areas concerned.

The dual articles of belief upon which

the program was based were that people, given the opportu
nity to do so, would "pitch in" to help their less fortu
nate fellow citizens and that poor people could specify
their needs accurately.

Thus, the CAA was to be a

"lightning rod" to which community problems and the re
sources to resolve them would be simultaneously attracted.
Today, nearly four years after its founding, 0E0 is
a center of controversy, even though it has used PPBS in
planning and executing the War on Poverty.

We live in a

society that prides itself on the efficient and visibly
effective solution of its problems.

But, in the war on

poverty, we have undertaken a program in which the needs of
the beneficiaries are varied and the "results" of our efforts
hard to demonstrate.

0E0 has been required to include

prospective beneficiaries in its programs, and thus has been
assigned a task that is not only difficult to execute, but
one in which the virtues of "efficiency and honesty" are
often, of necessity, lacking.
0E0 has tried to counter these problems by using a
management information system (MJS), a device developed
after the agency had been in existence nearly three years,
to determine who is being helped by its operations.

MIS

requires that each CAA report quarterly the number of its
participants, their ethnic and Income characteristics, and
to specify the results of CAA operations.

But It has been

difficult to secure accurate data with MIS, both because
of the clerical inefficiency of the units reporting, and
because of the inherent difficulties in monitoring social
change.

In the end, despite its reliance on cost-benefit

analysis and the management information system, the 0E0
budget 1ms been an act of faith.
premise implicit in this essay:

This leads to the major
that we must be willing

to accept a less-rigorous proof of results, and at the
same time, continue to seek more effective ways to meet
the as yet unfulfilled challenge of the Economic Opportu
nity Act of 1964.
The essay which follows rests on a survey of 0E0
management literature, numerous articles on public budget
ing ,and management, and interviews with men who work at
all,levels of 0E0-neighborhood center, local CAA, Regional
Offine, and National Headquarters, and it draws examples
from the CAA established In Richmond, Virginia, in 1965.?
RCAP.

It proceeds in five sections.

Chapter One argues

that citizens have in fact become more interested in the
end products of public disbursements, while Chapter Two
Indicates that 0E0 has adopted a systematic approach to
planning and evaluating Its activities.

The MIS, supposed

ly a way of demonstrating the results of activities so that
future activities can be planned, is the subject of
Chapter Three, while in Chapter Pour the operational
difficulties of OEO!s M S are spelled out.

In Chapter Five,

6
the nature of the political milieu in which 0E0 must seek
Its funds and Its effects on OEOfs program budgeting is
discussed at length.

CHAPTER I
FEDERAL BUDGETING— A QUICK OVERVIEW
In August, 1.965* the President directed that the
Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) he instituted
throughout the Federal government.^ He directed that the
installation he supervised hy the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB).

His turning to this system was the result of end

less struggles during the budget formulation process.

What

are, we going to do, how are we going to do it, how much of
it .are we going to do, and what will our efforts produce?
These are the perennial questions and the man who must
ultimately answer is the President.

The function of PPBS

is to aid him to making these decisions; with its aid,
Bureau leaders and Department heads can give the President
alternative courses of action for consideration.

With the

aid of this tool, they can focus their attention on the
country's goals and how to attain them most effectively
and efficiently.
1U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations of the Government
Operations Committee, P1arming Programming Budgeting;♦
initial Memorandum, Committee Print, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
1967* P* 1.

7

What is PPBS?

This is a question that has plagued

the citizen and caused concern within the Executive Branch
at the operating level*

On-the-site managers have conjured

up sinister pictures of the Bureau leader who constructs
models, turns to a computer and works a mathematical
formula to determine how much aid a given program will re
ceive in the forthcoming year*

This skepticism has been

best characterized by the statements of Vice Admiral Hyman
Rickover, the father of the atomic-powered submarine*
Criticizing PPBS and the cost-effectiveness studies upon
which it is based, he declared,
* . . I have no more faith in the ability of social
scientists to quantify military effectiveness than 1
do in the numerologists to calculate the future *2
So it goes*

The operating managers accuse the Department

heads of lack of contact with their problems, and the
PPBSers reply that their system is meant to be an aid to
decision making, not a decision maker*
features:

PPBS stresses four

(l) Identification of governmental goals, (2)

establishment of priorities in meeting these goals, (5)
choice of goal-seeking behavior with the least cost in
future years in mind, and (t) measurement of goal-directed
performance, so that one gets the maximum yield for each

^U.S*, Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations of the Government
Operations Committee, Selected Comment, Planning; Pro
gramming Budgeting, Committee Print, 90th Cong*, 1st sess.,
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dollar disbursed."

To see PPBS in its true perspective,

let us look at the budge t-making process as it op)erated. in
Washington not too many years ago.
The current budget formulation process, in which the
Executive Branch takes the initiative in proposing and the
Legislative Branch in disposing, was developed as a result
of the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921®
Prior to that time, there had been only sporadic interest
in executive budgeting.

Alexander Hamilton, as President

Washington’s first Secretary of the Treasury, had attempted
to institute "executive budgeting."

He did this by pre

paring a detailed summary of expenses and revenues and
presenting it to the Congress, until the development of
committees prevented this practice.

A Presidential commis

sion, appointed by Mr, Taft in 1910, recommended the sub
mission of an "executive" budget for fiscal year 1915®
Taft submitted his budget according to the format of the
commission proposal, which consisted of having Department
heads submit to him detailed accounts of the obligations
they intended to incur for the period under consideration.
However, this plan was frustrated by the fact that Taft had
been defeated in the elections and was succeeded by Woodrow
Wilson, who did not want to undertake budgetary reforms.4
^Ibid., p. 1.
Jesse Burkhead, Governmental Budgeting (New York,
N.Y.: Wiley and Sons, I9S 2), pp. 9~l8._
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These initial attempts to establish, executive
responsibility for planning a program of work for the
government proved abortive until 1921.

Until that time,

ail individual agency dealt with a friendly legislative
committee on Capitol Hill.

The Treasury merely put to

gether agency estimates in its annual 11Book of Estimates.11
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was explicit
in the duties it set for each of the branches of govern
ment.

To the President went the responsibility for sub

mitting to Congress annually a statement of proposed
revenues and expenditures for the ensuing year.

To a new

Bureau of the Budget (BOB), it assigned the task of
examining the agency requests for funding for the coming
years.

The Bureau’s recommendation on a particular fund

ing level could be appealed only to the President.

This

provision has partially served to reduce the dealings be
tween the Department head and the Legislative Committees.
It has not been wholly successful because legislators often
can ask friendly questions of Bureau leaders who testify
in hearings in which appropriations are involved.
Placement and coverage of the Bureau of the Budget
'at first proved troublesome.

Until 1999> BOB was attached

to the Department of the Treasury.

At that time, it was■

brought into the Executive Office of the President, an
entity created by President Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive
Reorganization Act.

This change was part of a new orienta-

11
tlon to the President* s duties that derived from the in
creasing complexity of government and the burgeoning number
of its programs*
BOB*s powers are great.

No federal form requesting

information of any character for use in government operations may legally be used without its approval.

All

government statistics collecting agencies have their
activities monitored by the Bureau, while all computer pro
curement is handled by this agency*

All legislation passed

by Congress is sent to BOB to determine whether or not it
is relevant to the President’s program as expressed by the
executive budget.

When the particular appropriations

measures are signed into law by the President, the Depart
ment head must come to BOB for an apportionment in order to
spend.

Even at this time, the President has, on BOB

recommenda11on, set up budgetary reserves in order to curb
agency spending.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, establishing
as it did mechanisms for making the budget -making process
an expression of the President’s thoughts on what the work
program of the Federal Government should be, was an innova
tion.

Legislators have grown so accustomed to discussion

and alteration of this work agenda that they have complained
when a President placed the responsibility for developing

^Ibid*, p. 259.
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a program on them.6
There is tension between the Executive and the
Leg.isl8.tive Branches of the Federal Government, and we can
see it in the construction of the Federal Budget*

In the

years immediately following the passage of the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, appropriations for various ventures
were made by what has become known as the 11line item11
method.

That is, a project was funded in terms of x

number of typewriters or y number of automobiles, and
money could be expended only for the purposes set forth in
the line item.

This practice developed because legislators

felt that the only way to curb executive expenditures and
burgeoning programs was to establish a limit on the re.sources that could be devoted to a program.'7 This method
gives no consideration to what the basic goals of
organized government are to be.

The "line item" or "Dawes"

orientation (as it was named after the first BOB Director
Charles Dawes), prevailed until the early thirties, when
the first attempts at “performance” budgeting were made.
“Performance" budgeting is a generic name given to
types of display of governmental expenditure in which pro
grams are described in terms of the goals to be attained by
^"Can The 1958 Federal Budget be Substantially
Reduced?", Congressional Digest, May, 19575 Vol. XXXVI,
p. 146. .
7‘Burkhead, Budgeting, p. 140.
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the expenditure of resources.

An early example of the

performance techniques is shown in the 1915 report of the
hew York Bureau of Municipal Research.

That group,

dividing public works functions, devised three classifica
tions of work:
sewerage.

street cleaning, street maintenance, and

They further divided these classifications into

11subfunctions0 and as a final touch, developed '’units of
work," such as "miles of streets flushed." Appropriations
were based on the number of these units of work, though
the system became so cumbersome that it had to be
abandoned.®
The Taft Committee on Economy and Efficiency, in
its«1912 report, stressed the importance of classifying
expenditures in terms of the class of work to be done.
This•was the same report that convinced Mr. Taft that
Presidential direction of the budget-making process was
required. Little was done to implement the performance
budget concept during the inter-war years. The only
Federal agencies developing performance schemes were the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Department of
Agriculture.
TVA was established to be a yardstick for the
measurement of the cost of power production.

It was orga,-

nized as a government corporation and enjoyed considerable

8Ibid.. p. 155.

autonomy in the development of its management practices.
Its operations were divided into four ’’programs:11 Naviga
tion and Flood Control, Fertilizer and Munitions, Resources
and Development, and General Services.

Each of these

’’programs” was further subdivided into sub-programs „ For
example. Resource Development is divided into divisions
for the development of Agricultural, Forest, Watershed
resources and Topographic Mapping.

Though these sub

programs are professionally organized, they participate in
each other’s work when the programs overlap.
Departments of TVA are encouraged to think; in terms of,
program and to participate jointly in program formula
tion. . . The approach keeps management focussed on
TVA objectives. . . .9,
Within each program, there may be a number of orga
nizational entities to carry out the work of the program.
Each has an account to which funds are devoted for operation
TVA has emphasized the comparison of actual costs with the
money allocated for the operations of its divisions, though
in some cases it has measured the end products of its in
vestment, as in fertilizer production.
Had it not been for the Second World 'War, there might
have been no further interest in budgeting. However, it
demonstrated that the government had grown too large to be
operated under the "Dawes” orientation.

The beginnings of

15
change in the form and substance of budgeting may be ob
served in the proposed expenditures submitted to Congress,
by the Navy in 19^7 and 19*1-8.
These budgets display, among other things, the
amounts of money to be disbursed for the operation of the
United States Naval Academy*

There is a detailed account

of the number and level of instructors to be hired, in
cluding the stricture that there shall be no more than
fourteen swordsmen for instructional purposes on the staff
in
at Annapolis*
Following this detailed account, there is
a breakdown of how the $1,980,000 is to be distributed in i
terms of functional areas such as Seamanship and Ordnance,
each of which has a vital role to play in the education of
capable Naval Officers.

This sort of presentation repre

sents a grow:Lng tendency to be concerned with "what11 dis
bursements have purchased, while simultaneously showing the
need for specification of precisely what articles the
money has procured.
This interest in the end result of appropriations
was felt beyond the Navy, and it influenced the Hoover
Commission, a group that had, been convened to study the
operations of the Federal Government. 11
10

This group met in

U.S., Bureau of the Budget, The Budget, 1918
(Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 19477,
p. 69*
11

' Burkhead, Budgeting, p. 13^•
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a year in which the BOB and the Department of the Treasury
were engaged in the discussion of management improvement.
In this context of change, the Hoover Commission re
ported that,
The whole budgetary concept of the Federal Government
would be refashioned by the adoption of a budget based
on functions activities and projects: This we de
signate a performance budget.12
The task force went on to say that the emphasis of governraent should no longer be on Mthings bought,” but rather
that it should focus on ”things done.” This, too, was the
basic thrust of the National Security Act of 19^9 AmendI
ments which stipulated that,

-

—

. . . authorized programs shall be administered in such
a form as the Secretary of Defense may determine. . .
to report the cost of readily identifiable functional
programs * . .*-5
■The Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 carried the idea even
further, requiring that the Budget set forth in such detail
as the President sees fit, the ”functions and activities”
of government *
The new emphasis on thinking about the Budget and
its preparation in terms of "projects” or "functions” has,
in fact, continued and reached a high watermark under the
leadership of Robert S. McNamara, the Defense Secretary
appointed by President John F. Kennedy.
12Ibld.. p. 155.
1h b i d .

He and his Comp-
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trolley Charles J, Hitch, conceived of the problem of
“national security” in terms of nine areas: Strategic
Retaliatory Forces, Continental Air and Missile Defense,
General Purpose Forces, Airlift and Sealift Forces,
Reserve and National Guard Forces, Research and Develop
ment, General Support, and Civil Defense and Military
Assistance.

These areas are unique, since they do not

describe the defense problem in terms of forces providing,
such as the Army or the Navy; they describe the defense in
Tli
terns of what has been provided (Table l).
TABLE 1
SHIFT IN MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION8,
Old Budget Itystem
Navy
Polaris
Marine Corps
-Carrier task forces
Air Force
i c m !s
Tactical aircraft
Air Defense aircraft
Long range bombers
Army
Air defense missiles
Armored divisions

" ~ NeW^Pranning Budgeting System
Strategic Forces
Polaris
ICBM1s
Long range bombers
General Purpose Forces
Marine Corps
Armored divisions
Tactical aircraft
Carrier task forces
Continental Defense Forces
Air defense aircraft
Air defense missiles

'Extracted from Murray L, Weidenbaum, nApplying Econo
mic Analyses” in Planning Programming Budgeting, ed. by Fre
mont Lyden and E.G* Miller (Chicago: Markham,'1967), p„ 168.
lii
? Alain C . Enthovain, Economic Analyses and Defense
Policy,1 in American Security Policy, ed* by Morton Berkowitz
and P.F. Block (New York, N.Y.: Free Press, 1965),
pp., 150-52.
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Basic to this description is the program element, in which
the combination of men and material resources necessary to
carry out the goal of the program is set forth.
PPBS* at Defense stresses the importance of using
mathematical and economic theories in the consideration of
national security questions.

For example, assume that the

goal of a missile defense system is to shoot down 97 percent
of the 100 missiles launched at this country by an aggressor.
Let us also assume that the missile system under considera
tion has a 50 percent chance of destroying the enemy's
missile on the first shot.

Simple mathematics suggests that

200 missiles will be required to carry out the defensive
goal.

The question then arises about the level of cost to

be involved in providing higher protection.

How much, for

example, would it cost to provide a 99 percent destruction,
and would the cost be worth the destruction? IB
^ Estimates
of what it will cost to add the extra 2 percent capability
are presented so that a decision-maker can reach a norma
tive judgment about whether the extra destruction justifies
the cost.

Thus, there are two questions in any defense

decision, the professional and the political.

The pro

fessional relates to the efficacy of the system under
consideration and the politics,! to the level of funds which
can be devoted to it.

I 5ITxLa.
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PP.BB approach is based on an overall look at De
fense Department requirements rather than at the often
partisan wishes of one service.

Moreover, the expanded

planning period of five years forces the planners to con™
sider the long-range cost implications of the decision.
In announcing the decision not to purchase another wing
of B&2 bombers, the Secretary of Defense reflected that the
procurement cost of one-half billion dollars was only about
one-third of the cost of operating the aircraft over a
period of five years set forth in PPBS.16
PPBS has cut across service lines.

In a program the

Navy and the Air Force may be required to contribute ele
ments of men and material, and the civilian Secretary of
Defense will make the decision about what proportion of
goods and services each will contribute. 17‘ In only one
program element is any service not forced to work with the
others, and this Is Anti-Submarine Warfare, controlled
solely by the Navy.
There have been faults with the PPBS approach at
Defense, and these have occurred with relatively spectacular
procurement items, such as the TFX fighter plane and the
non-nuclear powered USS John F. Kennedy, thus making PPBS
l6Ibid.
17
~1There Is controversy on this point. For example,
one year after deciding that USS John F. Kennedy was to be
fossil fueled, the Defense Department went ahead with plans
for a nuclear powered USS Chester W. Nlmitz.
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vulnerable to its critics, This raises the issue of un
certainty and how one is to deal with it.

At Defense,

stress has been placed on developing estimates of a situa
tion that range from optimistic to discouraging.

The

decision to make John F. Kennedy fossil-fueled was
partially based on a study that purported to show that
over the course of the attack carrier’s mission, there
would be a speed advantage of only one knot.

Moreover, the

Kennedy would still require rearming and replenishment«
Citation of these PPBS failures and successes serves
to show that use of this tool has put decision making
clearly into the hands of the civilian Secretary of Defense,
Furthermore, it has served to reduce the competitive
Interaction among the services as they address themselves
to the vital goal of national defense.
The critical difficulty with PPBS at Defense is that
there is no way to test the results of how effective plan
ning has been, short of war.

This has led men like Admiral

RIckover to question the assumptions on which decision
makers have made the allocation of scarce resources.

In

particular, the Admiral questions the assumption that our
sources of oil will always be secure, a critical premise in
the decision to build ships conventionally-fueled,"^

His

skepticism becomes important when he, as America’s foremost

Selected Comment, p . 37 •
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expert on nuclear power, testifies against an adversary
like the Secretary of Defense.
The outline that has been given serves to show how
PPBS is used in an obvious governmental function* namely
defense* and implicitly points to some of the difficulties
encountered in the attempt to apply PPBS to national
social resource development.
The 0E0 does operate on the premise that there is a
planning cycle in which appropriate national and local
bodies can identify goals* establish priorities among
those goals* devise programs to meet palpable needs* and
evaluate the success or failure of ongoing programs to
determine whether a given venture should be continued or
abandoned.

However, there are serious difficulties that

hinder the implementation of this innovative tool.
First, there is the requirement for highly educated,
and dedicated individuals to operate the PPBS information
collection devices.

This conflicts directly with the 0E0

philosophy that there should be "maximum feasible participa
tion" by the poor.

Furthermore, there is serious question

about how reliable the assessment of any human resource
development program can be, since at 0E0, as in all pro
grams , the results are "long run" in character.

Moreover,

goals such as "organization" of the poor are wholly unre
lated to any broad economic goals.

Finally, and possibly

most important, 0E0 is a one billion dollar agency in a
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plethora of Departments and Agencies whose "poverty” budget
aggregates twenty-eight billion dollars, and as 0E0
officials are quick to admit, BOB has never given it the
authority to plan expenditures other than its own.

These

are but the most prominent of the issues that will be con
sidered in the ensuing chapters of this discussion.

CHAPTER II
CEO FUNCTIONS AND PPBS ORGANIZATION
Until about the middle of the decade of the sixties,
relatively little had been done to plan a systematic attack
against poverty.

By this, we should understand an effort

with well defined goals and tools with which to measure
progress in attaining them. 1 The Johnson administration de
clared 11war11 on poverty in the early Fall of 196A, shortly
before the introduction of the earlier mentioned PPBS budgeting- techniques to the non-defense, federal spending agencies.
The,.,President declared that the agency to make anti-poverty
plans operational would be the Office of Economic Opportu
nity, within the Executive Office of the President.
Prior to discussing the 0E0 adaptation of PPBS to its
spending activities, one must consider the responsibilities
assigned to this agency, and the institutions that have been
developed for meeting its tasks.

Essentially, the Office of-

Economic Opportunity is a social-service organization created
1
»
‘Robert A. Levine, "Systems
Analysis in the War on
Poverty, " (Unpublished speech to the 29th meeting of the
Operations Research Society of America, May 18, 1966),
pp. 2-9.
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to implement locally-drawn plans of action in the War on
'

Poverty with a combination of Federal and local resources.

2

The organization was conceived in this fashion for
a number of reasons.

Some individuals felt that the exist

ing welfare programs are designed to ”buy off” the poor, and
over the course of the past few years there ha,s developed
the theory that those who live with the outward manifesta
tions of poverty know how to combat it best.

Finally,

critics have suggested that earlier programs discriminated
against the colored man.

*5

As mentioned earlier, the institutional form chosen
for .the execution of the war1s operational plans was an
independent office in the Executive Office of the President.
Some have felt that this gives the poor a permanent agency
to make their concerns known at the national level in addi
tion- to meeting some of the criticisms made of earlier
p
Institute of Government, University of Virginia,
Community Action Agencies in Virginia (Charlottesville,
Virginia: December, l95B7T~P» 1. In this connection, one
must distinguish between cash and in-kind support. The
former Is what its title suggests. The latter consists of
contributions of heat, light, etc. In the 31 cities for
which information is available, the non-Federal share of
support of Community Action Agencies was 26 million dollars.
Of this total, local communities provided 3 million dollars
in cash support.. See. also U.S. Congress, House of Repre- ‘
sentatives, Department of-Labor and Health Education and
Welfare Appropriations for 1969. Hearings before a Sub
committee of the House Appropriations Committee, House of
Representatives, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, p. 43.
^Michael Harrington, The Other America (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1963), p. 156.
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programs.

The agency is composed of a National Head

quarters and seven Regional Offices, and it employs about
2800 civil-service employees at these levels.

These

employees serve to perform, the vital functions that are
designated National Advocacy and Local Oversight.
National Advocacy refers to the submission to
Congress of a National plan for fighting poverty.

It is

presented to the Legislative Branch in the form of the
Budget, for which enabling appropriations legislation must
be parsed.

The annual process is a two-stage endeavor.

The Director of 0E0 must be able to tell the Bureau of the
(Budget ,fwhyn a particular venture is cost effective, and
moreover, he must be able to respond to the often hostile
.questions of Congressmen on the Appropriations Committee.
The agency must also provide supervision and ”local
oversight” to local CAAs.

It needs detailed Information

with which to make broad anti-poverty plans, and it must be
able to respond to requests for detailed Information.

To

illustrate the dual nature of the 0E0 management problem,
one might refer to the hearings held concerning the Fiscal
1969 0E0 appropriations.

There was considerable attention

given to the Job Corps proposals.

Questions focussed on

providing for the ultimate employment of these young men
and also on requests for detailed information concerning
the costs involved In the operation of centers that, had to

be closed after only short periods of operation.

h

In essence, the 0E0 Director and his assistants
must be able to furnish two types of information, and their
ability to do this will have a good deal to do with the
level of appropriations in the coming year.

In certain

cases, the queries leveled at him are openly hostile and
reflect a thinly veiled attempt to bring discredit on the
agency by showing that money has been disbursed foolishly
and perhaps even illegally.
Responding to BOB and Congressional interrogation
proves a formidable undertaking for reasons that will be
outlined in more detail later.

For now, It will suffice

to pay that in the proliferation of government agencies
that has taken place over the last few years, citizens auto
matically make the assumption that anti-poverty efforts and
CEO;are inseparable, and misdeeds and errors of judgement

k
U. 8., Congress, House, Department of Labor and
Health Education and Welfare Appropriations for 1969.
Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee, House of Representatives, 90th Cong., 2nd sess.,
1968, pp. 93~k.
Qjbid., pp. 41-2. In this instance Congressman
Michel of Illinois asserted that through the good offices
of CEO, the Woodlawn Organization, an agency partially
supported by 0E0 grants, secured the release of four, Mcon
victed murderers” in order that they might teach in a Wood
lawn program. Information subsequently furnished by 0E0
for the record proved that 0E0 had no connection with the
release of any felons in Illinois, if in fact such an act
had even transpired.
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have been incorrectly ascribed to that agency. 6

There

have been a few spectacular errors, e.g. the Blackstone
Ranger flap, and from them citizens have been, perhaps,
too quick in conjuring up an agency built on chicanery.
The most staggering problem is that of supervision.

A

typical Regional Office employs 175. civil service employees,
and an even smaller number of individuals approve dis
bursements that will be made to 170 CAAs, each employing
an average of forty workers.^

To understand the problem

of supervision, one must look at the Agency1s structure at
Rational. Regional and Local levels.
There are three levels of organization at 0E0:
Rational Headquarters, The Regional Offices, and the local
Community Action Agency.

Each has discrete respoiisi.bil5.ties,

and each uses PPBS in a manner appropriate to its function
and level of skill.
The National Headquarters serves as the chief liaison
point between the localities and Congress.

Its major

function is to present an integrated anti-poverty plan to
^Xbid., pp. 40-1. Here an allegation was made that
0E0 had funded, or was contemplating funding a ''’social
eating" venture. Here also OEO demonstrated that it had no.
connection with such a project, and that it had been con
sidered under the rubric of the "Older Americans Act," and
would be supervised by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare.
^Mr. Prank Rupp, Mid Atlantic Region Director of
Management Information Systems, Interview held in Washington,
D.G *, in November, 1968.
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the BOB and Congress.

Peripheral to this task is the job

of approving all grants made to Migrant Worker, American
Indian and experimental projects.

It acts as the national _

advocate for the poor, and it is divided by functional
areas, such as Headstart and Job Corps.
At one time, 8,11 decisions to fund projects,
irrespective of the target group, were made at the National
Headquarters.

Now, decision-making has been given to a

series of Regional Offices.

The country has been divided

into seven regions, and the offices for each region has
.offices for each state included within its borders, as well
as for the various programs that constitute the concerns of
0E0.
Finally, there is a series of Community Action
Agencies (CAAs) across the country.

These entities are

meant to be the basic operations,! unit in the War on
Poverty.

The legal requirements for establishing such

agencies have expanded and contracted over the four years
that 0E0 has been in operation.

One may state with confi

dence that a CM. Is a public or private non-profit agency,
designated by the regular organs of local government.

Its

purpose is to mobilise the resources of the community in
the job of making poor people self-sufficient.

Local govern

ment, as well as designating the agency to be the official
anti-poverty agency for the community, may and often does
appoint members to the agency1s governing board.

The most
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controversial point to date has been the requirement that
one third of the board’s members be from the target poor
to be served, and that these individuals be given the
opportunity to serve to the maximum extent feasible.^
The individual CAA operates on two levels.
is a governing board.

There

This body, operating through a series

of subcommittees, serves to devise a program for the
agency’s activities during the program year.

Typically,

the board has a program committee, on which a substantial
number of the members are from the poor community.
Figure 1 shows the pattern by which they should, ideally,
make plans for the CAA1s program.
There is also an executive staff in the local agency.
It Is composed of paid employees who supervise the daily
operations of the agency.

These individuals are not civil-

service personnel, and they administer the program along
broad guidelines set by the board.

There may be some over

lap, in that some of the board members may be community
organizers * and as such work under the supervision of the
executive staff.
Finally, poor people are brought into the organiza
tional complex in a number of variant ways. The Richmond
CAA, known as RCAP, has organized, for example, a series

°U .S ., Congress, House, An Act to Provide an .improved
Economic Opportunity Act of 1967. Pub. L. 90-222, 90th'
Cong., 1st sesso, 19o?, S.2^88, p. 51*
^Subsequent
was prohibited, by

to my r e s e a r c h dual m e m b e r s h i p
administrative regulation.

of this

type
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of Neighborhood Advisory-Councils in which the residents of
poor areas may come together to articulate their needs and
desires so that they can be taken to the governing board.
Moreover, there are a number of Community Action Neighbor
hood Centers, in each of the poverty-stricken*areas of
Richmond.

Each has a permanent staff, and community resi

dents are encouraged to take their problems to the center
to seek assistance in meeting their needs.

For instance,

a resident may complain of insufficient street lighting.
The center worker will endeavor to gather other residents
of the same block so that together they may solve the
problem.

This may involve- writing a group letter to the

agency manager concerned with the problem or visiting his
office.

The use of such methods, it is hoped, will bring

about a sense of political efficacy.

Additionally, the

.center worker hopes that this sort of reaction will en
courage people to come to neighborhood council meetings.
Thus one can see that there is a vast stock of needs to be
met by such an agency.
The very complexity of 0E0 foreshadows the difficulty
of realizing, in practice, the goals of planning, execution
and control.

Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to

institutionalize PPBS at each level of GEO.
The National Headquarters PPBS is governed by the
budget submission process, and it is coordinated by the
Office of Research, Plans Programming and Evaluation.

0E0
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must submit its budget proposals to BOB by October 15 of
the year preceding the fiscal year in which the obligations
will be made.

The process consists of the submission of

a series of documents and narrative documentation:

Pro

gram Memoranda, the Plan Financial Plan and Special
Analytical Studies.

These serve to explain what the

agency will do and why.
The Plan Financial Plan that is submitted to the
BOB is the result of consultation of the National and
Regional officers.

Each Regional Director submits his

dollar request for operation of 0E0 programs within his
Region.

He bases his wishes on the demonstrated efficiency

of various agencies in meeting past community problems,
although he can have no specific idea about what local CAA
requirement will be.

As the observer descends the ad

ministrative ladder, he would discover that each super
visor could be more specific about the needs of his
particular area.

He can be more certain about the work

that has gone into assessing community problems and what
degree of urgency should be attached to a communityrs req
quest for grant funding.
He can form clearer judgements
about the efficiency of the CAA concerned.

This pattern of

de-centralization is one of the most disturbing features
of the entire 0E0 venture though, for it makes close superQ

"interview, Rupp.
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vision of spending virtually impossible*

General Accounting

Office (GAO) inspections reveal honest errors and the more
sinister chicanery only after the fact
The Inspection of CAA. activities is done by means
of 0S0 activity inspections, GAO audits and Management
Information System (MIS) reports*

The latter device re

quires that each agency tabulate details of money disbursed
and the results gained, though It is of limited value for
reasons that will be explained in detail later *
In summary, then, the 0E0 is an institution, the
goal of which is to eliminate the paradox of poverty In
this, the richest nation on earth. It makes this goal opera
tional by the establishment of a series of largely federallyfinanced social service centers known as Community Action
Agencies. These organizations make plans to fight poverty
In their localities by a combination of pre-packaged
federal programs and a measure of local ingenuity.

PPBS

has been adapted to 0E0 over the course of the last four
years, and its value as a tool in decision--making will be
the concern of the balance of this essay.

I use "chicanery" in its dictionary meaning of
"deception by artful subterfuge." In the Norfolk Virginian
Pilot of December A, 1968, there is an article reporting
the” conviction, on charges of embezzlement of 0E0 funds, of
the Rev* Terry Wingate, an official associated with the
Tidewater Virginia CAA, STOP (Southeastern Tidewater
Opportunity Program).

CHAPTER III
THE IDEA OP A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
111 earlier sections, it was suggested that govern

ment officials, confronted with the task of allocating
limited resources among competing projects, developed
PPBS a budget technique In which the costs and benefits
of alternative public programs are simultaneously dis
played o Use of this technique requires the development
of a Management Information System (MIS), so that execu
tives can tell how well plans are being carried out and
to change ongoing programs, should this prove necessary<
,1
-■?

An MIS, as has been indicated earlier, is essentiall

:
d way of obtaining Information about a given venture and
putting it before a manager who must melee decisions based
on ite

Though authorities disagree about the specific

facts that should be presented, they concur in saying that
it should be more than simply a system of accounting report
It should, the experts concur,

p

transmit information

necessary for the operation of a financial system, such as.
1R. L. Martino, "The Development of a Total Manage
ment System," In Management Systems, ecu by Peter Schoderbeck (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1968), p.* 121.
2

Leonard Garrett and Milton Silver, Production

'the balance in an expenditure account, as well as the orga
nization 1s progress In meeting publicly-announced goads.
Moreover, one should be able to anticipate organizational
problems by using MJS data.

In doing these jobs, the

system should be able to transmit Information about the
atmosphere in which the organization operates.
0E01s MIS is, structurally a pre-printed form into
which CAA. managers place stail sties, indicating for each
program account, money disbursed, the number, ethnic
characteristics and income level of those serving end
those served, as well as the "results" obtained as the end
product of the disbursement.

In a supplement to the

statistical summary of the report, the CAA Director comments
on the community atmosphere in the area in which the CAA is
located.

He is required to explain significant shortcomings

and strengths in the operations, and he is compelled to
comment on specific problem areas, such as the recruitment
of managerial personnel.

The narrative portion of the

report Is thus the opportunity for the Director to tell all
that will help the Regional Offices understand what his

Management Systems (New York: Hare our't, World Inc., 1966).
p. 6Bo~and Roland Daniel, "Management Information Crisis,
in Management Systems. ed. by Peter Schoderbeck (New York:
Wiley and Sons, 19687, pp. 53~57 and also James D.
Gallegher, Management Information Systems and the Computer
(New York: American Management Association, 19617, p To^T*
^Daniel, op. clt., p. 57*

particular problems are.
While this attempt to give the manager the opportu
nity to speak to the problems of his area does take away
from the idea that the report is a collection of numbers,
there is no doubt that it is meant to be an attempt to
make an agency manager organize his operation in a careful
and thorough manner.

The manual governing the system’s

use states that the only way for the agency to obtain the
date, required by MIS is to develop "score cards,n on which
the required information can be tabulated on a daily basis.

i[

'..-Thus, there is a combination of evaluation in terms of
■"numbers that can be presented to Congress and evaluation in
^terms of subjective data that can be used to help local
and regional managers think about where their agencies are
Agoing.
1’

That this sytern is clearly intended to be evaluative

Is indicated by the announcement which accompanied the
adoption of MIS by the Office of Economic Opportunity.
Theodore M« Berry, the National Community Action Program
Director declared that MIS was being Inaugurated so that
henceforth all levels of Community Action Program manage
ment would be able to measure program progress, in terms

!i
U. S., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Grantee Reporting Manual (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 19o7j, p. 16.

of objectives. Moreover, the Grantee Reporting Manual holds
that,
The GAP progress “reporting system attempts to monitor
the progress of poor people through a series of
c
process steps designed to take them out of poverty.
Thus, a few observations may be ms.de by way of
summary, 6

CEO managers may often be reticent, when, asked

to specify exactly "how" their programs have helped the
communities in which CAAs are operating.

This is for the

very good reason that the results of agency programs are
often long range.

Moreover, as we shall see later, agency

managers have often encountered difficulties in obtaining
funds because they have been unable to demonstrate the
effectiveness of their ventures, in meeting established
goals.

MIS a.rose to meet this need for information, so that

directors could test the adequacy of plans they had developed

^Ibid., p. 17 .
6This discussion of MIS does not, by design, explain
the variant methods used to assess the efficiency and im
pact of 0E0 programs. This is because the ’’management audit”
and other in depth studies of programs and individual
agencies focus on the detection of defad.cation and other
varieties of financial misconduct, not program impact. Also
Hearings, Appropriations, p. 98. "Frank Murphy, the Assistant
Director of Job Corps, when queried about GAO reports of its
audits held, ”what I mean Is that the sort of reports they
produce for us a.re on an ad hoc basis, are not really manage
ment instruments for us to use in making management decisions.
To the same effect Bertrand Harding, Acting Director of 0E0,
held, ’’the audit activity is primarily a fiscal and financial
analysis of the Community Action Agency to evaluate the
accounting system they have and to detect fraud.”
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for social resource development and so that they could ob
tain money for further ventures.

A survey of the efficacy

of 0E0 MIS will be the subject of the ensuing section.

CHAPTER IV
MIS AND ITS PriEALLS
MIS .has been exceedingly difficult to apply to 0E0
programs for reasons that will be explained In detail as
we proceed.

To summarize, however*, uneven personnel skill

has caused ’’result” reporting that is inaccurate and tardy;
’’results” of 0E0 programs are hard to specify and even more
difficult to relate to the achievement of broad economic
goals; and MIS cannot be reliably used as a planning tool.
This is not to say that CEO has not made tremendous efforts
to institute an integrated management system for its
activities.

It has consistently, under congressional

pressure, done this, but the fact remains that given the
speculative connection of 0E0 programs with measurable
social progress, there is inevitable vagueness in evaluation
that must attend this, or any other, social resource develop
ment program.

Let us now look at the reasons that MIS and

PPBS are hard to relate to 0E0 operations.
Any MIS, whether it serves in a government agency or
in a profit-making organization, has three distinct functions.
It first documents the action that is being carried on to
attain the objectives of the group It serves.
39

It tells
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"what is going on,11 Additionally, it relates the affairs
of each segment of the whole organization to the over™
riding purpose for which the organization is established.
Finally, it serves as a planning instrument, with which
executives in the organization can make future plans. 1
There has been a good deal of controversy about what,
exactly, it was that 0E0 was established to do.

To dispel

confusion, one might well read a few pertinent portions of
the legislation establishing the agency.

The "Declaration

of Purpose” for the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as
amended, holds that,
. , , it is therefore the policy of the United
..States to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst
of plenty. . . by opening to everyone the opportunity
for education. . . the opportunity to work and the
opportunity to live in decency and dignity.2
The Act, with its five titles, authorizes the carrying out
of this policy and declares that one way to do this is to
provide a Community Action Program (CAP) that will mobilize
the resources of the whole community--national, state, and
3.ocal— -to make the poverty™stricken self sufficient."

Thus,

by logical extension, an MIS to be effective, must show how
1
Daniel, "Management Information Crisis,” p. 54.

o

"U.S., Congress, AN Act to Provide An Improved Eco
nomic Opportunity Act of 19571 Pub. L.”90-2.22, 90th Cong.,
1st sess., 1957'/'S.2538, p. 1.
^Ibid., p. 27.
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the purposes for which this program was established are
being carried out, and moreover, it should show how
change can be carried out, when earlier plans have not
worked well*

Ideally, an examination of the facts should

show that the GAA Director, when he discovers that a need,
and enthusiasm exist for a program, he and the agency can
execute-it.
How does the MIS function, and what have its
problems been, as it has reported activities in the CAP?
Mien MIS was introduced, a series of administrative
memoranda declared, that its purpose was to tell who was
!i
being helped by 0E0 programs.
In providing the informa
tion, it would not only document the efforts being made to
eliminate poverty, it would, its apologists held, serve to
give the CAAs information indispensible for the planning of
future problems. Early memoranda predicted that it would
take time” to make MIS operational, but that after a brief
initial period, the GAAs would discover that they had a
splendid planning tool, well worth all the effort that
would have to be ms.de to implement it.
As has been indicated earlier, MIS requires that a.
4U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Community Action Memoranda Series,
No. 71, p. 1.
rp
"II* S., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Community Action Memoranda Series,
No* 6?, p. 1*
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CAA report three categories of information:

(l) the number

of participants in its programs, (2 ) their ethnic and in
come characteristics, and (5 ) the "results” of dollar dis
bursements.

This requires that the agency maintain detailed

records of all its contacts, and it has led to problems
that are both clerical and conceptual in character, as we
can tell from looking briefly at the Richmond Community Action

C
Program, RCAP.
The clerical problems are largely derived from the
fact that RCAP1s activities are carried out through the
agency of five neighborhood centers, staffed largely by a
combination of professionals, VISTA personnel, and in
digenous poor.

Moreover, established groups, such as the

Richmond Public Schools, conduct programs such as HEADSTART,
and groups such as the Virginia Union University and the
Richmond Chamber of Commerce have conducted RCAP programs.
This has led to a great disparity in the skill level of the
reporting agencies and has meant that ROAP's report has been
7
tardy and not wholly accurate.1
bIt could, of course, be that Richmond and RCAP are
not "typical," but I know of no evidence that leads me to
believe that they are unique with regard to the problems
under discussion.
^Mr. Frank Rupp, MIS Specialist Mid Atlantic Region
CEO, Interview held in Washington, D.C., September i960 . Mr.
Rupp indicated that RCAP's problems were typical of all
agencies in the region, in that they touched upon tardiness
and accuracy, but they were not of great proportions.
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The important point to remember here is that this
tardiness is a normal condition of operation and unrelated
to any suggestion of misconduct.

It is part of business

in a larger bureaucracy.
The initial reaction to the MIS at RCAP was that it
was, njust another Washington report 111, imposed by an
unsympathetic bureaucracy that was unaware of the demands
made on agency time, and the limited supply of top
o

managerial talent.

There was, at first, talk that the

agency would be compelled to close its doors for one day
a:month, in order to tabulate the data from all of the
neighborhood centers.

t

Despite this initially unfavorable

reaction, agency officers went to Washington In May 1968,
for a series of MIS training sessions.

These focused not

only on the requirements for MIS reporting, but also on
techniques that would lead to more reliable planning, and
they were part of a regional management improvement program. 10

Equipped with this technics,1 information, the maga-

gers returned to Richmond to educate their neighborhood
workers in MIS techniques.
The first training session for target-area poor
q
John Chiles, Assistant Director RCAP, Interview held
in Richmond, Virginia, October, 1968.
^Ibld„
10Interview, Rupp. Management teams from compsjiies
“
such as Arthur D. Little are in the process of visiting
all CAAs in the Mid Atlantic region.

people was held la June 1968.

At this session, conducted

In RCAP *s central offices, there was an. air of consterna
tion and disgust.

This was caused by the difficulties that

these individuals encountered in obtaining the information
required by MIS.

For example, in compiling totals of

individuals "reached” by RCAP, many of the workers found
it difficult to distinguish between a person who had
"walked in" to a center and those who had been "outrenched"
by the center1s workers. Totals of persons reached by
various methods were often inaccurate. In isolated cases,
persons who had left employment programs to accept jobs
had been listed erroneously as "dropouts."^

Since the

workers had applied themselves to the task of gathering
information assiduously, there was discouragement and
questioning that ran to the general effect of, "just what
does all this mean anyhow?11
An assistant director of RCAP, addressing himself
to the question of the substance of MIS reporting declared
that the execution of MIS reporting Involves a "numbers
1p
game" of spectacular proportions. * To determine whether or
not this charge is correct, one must consider the type of
information that is generated by a report and how it is used
in documenting the coverage of programs, reporting the
11

“ Interview, Chiles.
i2lbid.
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satisfaction of broad economic goals and planning for the
future. In maiding this examination, let us remember the
declared purpose of the Economic Opportunity Act:

namely

to mobilize community resources to make poor individuals
self-sufficient. 0E0 measures self-sufficiency by whether
a man1s income places him above or below a "poverty line,"
currently defined as an annual income of 3>200 dollars for
an urban family of four.^

As good a program as any to

examine is the Richmond HEADSTART venture.
The Fall quarter, 1968, MIS report indieah es that,
working through the Richmond Public School System, RCAP
sponsored a Pull Year HEADSTART program.1^

It served 104

participants, and in doing so, spent a, total of 17,000
dollars. The vast majority of these youngsters were five
years of age, Negro, and came from families whose income
placed them below the poverty line. Evidence indicates
that 58 children received medical care that continued on
into the next quarter, and that nearly 10 percent were
mentally-retarded. It shows that six, or only four percent,
were from families with incomes above the poverty line.
This latter fact is not too alarming, since'HEADSTART
lb
■ Office of the President, Office
' of
hieS., Executive
Economic Opportunity, Community Action Memoranda Series,
No. 67™5,.p. 1.
11
RCAP MIS Report, dated October 18, 1968. Unless
otherwise cited all references to HEADSTART facts are
derived from this source.

regulations stipulate that up to 10 percent of the program
participants may be drawn from the non-poor.

Furthermore,

families whose sole source of income is public assistance
may qualify for the program, whatever their income level. IS
^
The report goes on to say that 17 children came from
families who received public assistance, though there is
no way of telling what portion of their income was derived
from these payments.

\

Thus, at the documentary level, the report functions
in an excellent manner.

It demonstrates that, in the case

of this particular venture, Richmond organisations
affiliated with the public schools and the churches, did
commit funds and resources to an activity, the benefits of
which went to the intended beheficiaries. The RCAP assistant
director, though, skeptical about the overall value of MIS,
did admit that in the sense that it prevented the abuse of
a program meant for the poor of Richmond, it had served a
useful function.

In the past, he related, there had been

abuses of the HEADSTART program precisely because such a
safeguard did not exist. 16 However, there are levels of

15u * S . , Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity,•Headstart Child Development (Washington
Government Printing Office, 19677, pV ST'
16

Interview, Chiles. This Is a hotly contested point.
At page 97 of his Review of Economic Opportunity Programs,
the Comptroller General of the United Stales holds that of
557 children enrolled in 11 centers, 22 percent were found
to have been from families above the poverty line. However,

*7
Information that go well beyond documentation, and we would
do well to consider them.
In offering the HEADSTART program as part of its
anti-poverty tools, 0E0 and RCAP have made the assumption
that poor children are peculiarly vulnerable to the prob
lems of ill-health, under-education and general cultural
ennui, and that it is the legitimate function of government
to attack these conditions, 171 Moreover, it has assumed
that there will be incremental change that can be measured
1o

to give some indication of program success.

Its most

important assumption is that, if one reads the language
of the Economic Opportunity Act, that this venture will help
bring people out of poverty.

It is here that MIS reporting

breaks down, and it does so for the reason that it is hard
to measure, in the present, long-range potential social
change vdth the use of statistics or any current indicators,
and it is virtually impossible to relate incremental change
to dollar disbursements.

Furthermore, the'relationship be

tween internal motivational change and economic development

in view of Mr, Chilesf candor it seems proper to accept his
characterization of the Richmond situation as correct.
17
Head start/, Child Development, p . 1,
°U.S., Congress, Senate, Criteria for Evaluation in
Planning State and Local Programs, A study pursuant to
S, Res. 55.? 90th Cong., 1st sessT, 1967; P- 9«

is tenuous.

The narrative portion of the report does

attempt to depict social change, but a skillfully written
report can give a false impression of progress. 1 9^

Further

more, no parent wants to use his child as part of a control
group to determine what the consequences of neglect and the
benefits of attention are.
As they face this dilemma of immeasurability,
planners at all levels, are forced to ask, "how good is
HEADSTART, when compared with another program as a. potential
claimant on funds in the federal budget?” In other words,
how measurable and direct are the benefits of this or any '
other 0E0 program, as they seek to achieve broad economic
goals?
There is evidence suggesting that HEADSTART does in
deed increase the poor child’s readiness to learn, in the
conventional school setting. 20

However, this benefit is

related to anti-poverty efforts, only insofar as it prepares
the children to undertake employment or higher education,
^%lr. Louis Bailey, Field .Representative, Mid Atlantic
Region 0E0, Interview held in Washington, D.C. September,
19b8. Mr. Bailey indicated that well written reports can
say nothing and that he, as a trained social worker, must
visit the site of operations to tell what the quality of a
program is.
20

This too, is an arguable point. In Review of
Economic Opportunity Programs, the Comptroller General holds,
TrFrom the testing techniques as were made available to us at
the centers where we made examinations, children who had
participated in HEADSTART, made modest gains in social,
motivational and educational skills.

fifteen years later.

The report, taken by itself, does not

and cannot measure the quality of the program, offered by
the individual CAA.

In effect MIS operates on the assump

tion that HEADSTART is efficacious and that other pre
packaged programs, designed to a great extent in Washington
are effective.

By and large, funds are earmarked for use

in programs that have a large clientele and are popular
politically.

That the funding question has been made

"political” is understandable, but it means that the alloca
tion of funds may have nothing to do with a program’s pro
fessional merits.
The issue of criteria, or conditions of success,
becomes even more crucial, in approaching program accounts
such s,s "Administration and Organization." The declared
purpose of, "community organization,” for example. Is to,
encourage anti-poverty program participation. It in
cludes Involving residents of low-income neighborhoods
in the affairs of their own community by encouraging pp
people to organize and direct their own efforts. . .
An indicator used to measure achievement of this purpose is
the, "number of community meetings held, M and the,
"attendance at those meetings ♦"

This is a very legitimate

way of gauging activity, but it really doesn’t tell us very

21

U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Grantee Reporting Manual (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967 )7~P• 102.

much/ since it doesnit tell us much about the number of
problems solved or attitudes changed.22
The plain fact is that the programs with which the
0E0 is associated, even the widely-acclaimed HEADSTART,
deal in "results” that cannot be quantified with precision.
We can be relatively certain that some good will come from
them, but the amount and duration of that good are specula
tive.

The only satisfactory evaluations that have been

done with respect to CEO programs have been done in great =
depth and have taken long periods of tine into consideration
as in the Glen Cain study of the Job Corps and the General1
Accounting Office study of the entire war on poverty. 2d
"
The former of these two reports was informative
exactly because it endeavored to relate dollars disbursed
to important gains in educational ability and earning capa
city, the only sensible justification for conducting an anti
poverty program.

In doing so, it made more detailed informa

tion available than could possibly be provided, by an MIS
report. For example, by referring to it, the reader can
22

The report would say nothing of the hostilities
generated by articulating needs, only to discover that
they could not be met, given the level or variety of re
sources in the community.
P'i
U.S., Congress, Joint Committee Report, Review of
Economic Opportunity Programs, A Study pursuant to Title II
1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 196A,
91st Cong., 1st sess., 196 9, P« 2. This document required
lA months to complete and was the result of "spot" examina
tions of hundreds of files at CAAs across the country.

discover that for each five months in a Joh Corps camp,, the
participant gains the benefits of nearly a year of formal
education.

This costs the taxpayers 3510 dollars and will
benefit the trainee in the amount of 3710 dollars. 24
Furthermore, the explanatory tables included in the body
of the report enable the reader to determine how much
benefit the trainee would gain from different given periods
of time in the Corps. 25
^ These benefits are measured in
terms of increase in earning power, and for a one year
period in the training program offered by Job Corps, the
enroilee will gain about 35 cents an hour . t o spending
26 in presenting these figures, Cain makes the
power.~
important point that,
No allowance is made for any benefits that stem from
.• general improvement in civic behaviour, lower crime
rates, more stable family relationships, better'up-”
bringing of children they will have or other such,
hard to measure consequences of a youth’s experience
in the C o r p s . 2?
The CEO MIS should, relate to the broad purpose of
movement across the poverty line, but even in connection with
employment programs such as the 1968 RCAP/Chamber of Commerce
24U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Education and
Lab or, Economic Opportunity Act Amendments of 1967,
Hearings before the Committee, ’House of Representatives on
H.R. 8311, 90th Cong., 1st sess*, 1967, p. 2371.

Summer work enterprise, MIS data is unsatisfactory, if one
wants to determine how many individuals were raised In
economic status„ Its enrollees had their incomes raised by
200 dollars per month for each of the two months that they
were enrolled in the program, and the information submitted
by MIS report shows that 51 of the 260 participants went on
pO
to college in the Fall.
This does not say, however, how
many people were raised above the poverty line, nor does
it say anything about the individual changes that students
may have undergone. The narrative portion of the report
speaks of, "an attitude of understanding and development of
a. sense of pride,
In any report.

but then these are standard phrases

The melancholy fact seems to be that there

is no accurate way to relate dollars disbursed to improve
ment in the earning capacity of the beneficiary, his
chances for a better life, or the social costs of crime,
juvenile delinquency or unemployment.
We indicated earlier that an MIS is supposed to
function as a planning device, but this is difficult at 0E0
because by requiring the MIS reports to be submitted every
quarter, little long-term planning Is possible.

The RCAP

assistant director even maintains that this means that no

October 18, 1968, pages
unnumbered„

advanced planning can be done with MIS, since it gives no
indication or prediction of upswings in community interest
in RCAP or its individual programs. 30
Thus, at the local level, there has developed the
feeling that the 0E0 MIS is a collection of numbers, and
nothing more, designed for the sole purpose of justifying
a program to Congress.

Its critics, in saying that it has

little or nothing to do with program variety or funding
levels, could well point to the testimony of CAP Director :
Theodore M, Berry.

Speaking to Congressman Melvin Laird,

he declared that MIS was developed for the sole purpose of.
presenting hard fact summaries to congressmen who sit on
Appropriations Committees. 31 There is thus consternation
on the part of local CAA managers, when confronted with the,
.I!:lf you can't count it, it doesnft countn thinking made
/plain by Berry's testimony.

0E0 has, however, in the past

year developed an HIntegrated management system” for Its
own operations that has enabled it to counter the changes of
MIS critics who suggested that the report was wholly
^Interview, Chiles.
33'Hearings, Appropriations * p . 224.
i
"I am happy to
say that the management information system— which we designed
and. instructed the community action agencies in its use--is
now beginning to produce the kind of data on which this type
of presentation is based. Much of the data presented here
is the result of the reporting system through our MIS. The
system provides information on the community action agencies
programs, their costs, what participants are being served
and what is happening to them.”

54
meaningless.
Basically, uintegrated management11 refers to a view
of decision-making in which an organization is viewed as
established to serve one overriding function or purpose.
Its divisions may be linked by electronic information
transfer devices, and each division's actions are animated
by the single purpose of the organisation. The manager
must be able to bring the activities of one division into
harmony with those ,of the others.
The concept of integrated management has been given
legislative approval, since congressional critj.Gismo of 0B0
have not centered so much on the worthiness of the goal
of conquering poverty as they have on the waste of funds
that has come about because of slipshod administration and
proven dishonesty.^

Criticisms have taken legislative

form In the 1967 Amendments to the 1964 Economic Opportunity
"52Martino, ,fThe Development of A Total Management
^
System, ” p. 123.
.S., Congress, Senate, Riots, Civil and Criminal
Disorders, Hearings before 'the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations.of the Committee on Government Operations,
Senate, Pursuant to S.Res. 216, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968,
p. 2740. Senator McClellen, in an Investigation of 0E0
financing of an educational project in which functionally
Illiterate hoodlums were used as teachers, commented, ’5I
just can’t understand that we could have a project financed
by the government with all those things going on. . , while
the head of an agency. . . diligence was being exercised,
just the normal diligence to see that the project was going
right, and that money was properly spent?11

55
Act. ‘ The most important stipulation for our purposes is
the section in which the Director of 0E0 is prohibited from
granting funds to CAAs that have not adopted a ,fsystematicn
approach to their use."^

This means that the individual CAA

must establish its goals, give them relative priority, and
periodically evaluate the execution of programs designed to
carry out goals.'"
The Regional Office, in which the funding authority
for most OAA programs is vested, has developed a basically
six'-pronged attack or approach with which to carry out the
inspection and funding of a CAA (See Figure 2).

A. given

number of days before the beginning of the new program year,
eachvCAA submits documents establishing its legal title to
be the anti-“poverty agency for the community, and prior to
the beginning of the program year, it receives a Field. PreReview.

After this review, it submits its fun,ding request

for the coming year.
The significance of this new procedure is that it
permits the funding authorities to inspect the operations of
xii
An Act To Provide An Improved Economic Opportunity
Act, p. 1.
^ Ibld,, p. 36c.

U .S ., Executive Office of the President, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Applying For A CAP Grant, OEQ
Instruction Series, NoTc/flO-l, p~ T-l.
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the agency, prior to investing any money in its ventures .
During this meeting, program and funding levels are set, and
they are later confirmed by a "letter of understanding,"
issued by the Regional office. At this meeting, in which
the CAAfs board participate, the regional grantors tell
the local authorities of their general impression of the
CAA1s management and overall effectiveness.

Methods of

.evaluating proposed programs are also discussed, and it may
be agreed that MIS reports will be the sole method of
evaluating many of the programs that will be established*
.The "letter of understanding,11 which follows the meeting,
is explicit in telling the CAA, "how much it will get,15 and
the local and regional officials are adamant in holding
that the funding intentions made public at the meeting are
go
firm c
Hardness of budgetary commitments is required by the
fact that at the same time that local and regional personnel
are negotiating, national personnel may be carrying out
their job of obtaining funds for the whole 0E0 program from
Congress.

CAA budget years and the federal fiscal year

overlap.

For example, the RCAP budget year begins each

October 1, while the federal fiscal year begins on July 1„

3
^8,Mr. Chiles said that he saw? no virtue to a well-*
written proposal, because he wondered if anyone really
read it. Mr. Bailey held that the best-written appeal
might be of no avail, if "there was just no money.

58
OEO appropriations measures for the fiscal year 1969 were
not signed into law until the early part of October, and the
national offices operated under a "continuing resolution,".
which prohibited it from incurring obligations in fiscal
1969 at a rate higher than fiscal 1968 . ^

This meant that

by the end of the summer of 1968, RCAP1s budget had to be
cut, as part of a general economy drive.

Even without this

extraordinary contingency, a CAA can increase its program
I| y*\

only by about 15 percent a year if that much IL
Along with the general scarcity of funds Congress
has placed specific restriction on types of programs that
OEO may conduct and the beneficiaries it may aid.

Con

sequently, OEO officials have had to establish limits to
funds and types and levels of programs that are available
to /the Individual agency.

Funds are scarce, and the alloca

tion once made (as part of a shared process in which the
Field Representative and the District Manager sit down to
‘hash out" the CAA’s level) is a fairly well-fixed figure*
Thus, MIS or any other form of analysis, no matter how
•59

^wMr. Paul Roys ton, Assistant Administrator for CAP
Mid Atlantic Region, Interview held in Washington, D.C.,
October, 1968,
40
Interview, Roys ton. And also OEO responded to
GAO%s report on its activities as follows, "for the fiscal
year beginning July 1, 1967* OEO did not receive its
appropriation until January 1, 1968, after half of the
operating year had passed.- Community Action Programs,
particularly, have suffered from these funding problems."

favorably it depicts the activities of an individual CAA,
will not make much difference in its ultimate funding
level.

CHAPTER V
THE RAZE THAT IS OEO
Thus far, this essay has considered the "mechanics"
of how one of OEO1s major evaluative tools, MIS, operates.
We have also seen that the limited utility of MIS, and
thus PPBS, Is in part related to the quality of information
it produces.

There is, however, another limitation:

the

political milieu in which OEO must operate * The milieu
which must be mastered If OEO is to gain the funds
necessary to stay alive on the Washington scene.

Thus,

one can state that while PPBS does form a good way of pre
senting a plan for the execution of any legitimate govern
mental function, complete with supporting justifications
and explanations of costs and impacts and benefits, there
are some other questions that one must answer.

Any cost-

benefit analysis, however accurate It may be, must still
pass muster politically.
Aaron Wildavsky, in The Politics of the Budgetary
M
n.iiri^n.iii.i
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Process, does a good deal to destroy the myth that public
expenditure can be placed securely on a rational, non
political base, such as that envisaged by those who are
committed to program budgeting.

Essentially he holds that

budgeting is a. game,

1

in which there are two fundamental

objectives, "defending the base," and, "expanding the
p
base."
These two terms refer to the process of establish
ing a firm level of commitment and increasing this bane by
small yearly increments.

Wildavsky maintains that an

agency leader who is successful in the struggle to accomplish
these ends relies on three tactics:

(i) he must create and,/

or maintain a clientele of concerned citizens who benefit
from the agency’s work; (2) he must develop and uphold a
reputation for honesty and efficiency In the agency; and
(5) his group must produce a "useful product/'

The pay-off—

one way or the other— will- come in legislative and appropria
tions hearings.

Without evidence of support, without

reputation and demonstrated effectiveness, the Bureau
leader will find it difficult to "defend, his base," let
alone, "expand his b a s e . H o w does OEO meet these condi
tions for bureaucratic success in Washington?

Let us con

sider, In succession, each of the three points just cited.
The poor are numerous--estimate of their number
ranging from 25 to 50 million persons--and thus OEO has a

^Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of _tbe Budgetary Pro
cess (pew York: Little Brown and Co., 19S¥)7~p. 6.™
2
Ibid., p. 15.
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large potential clientele.

li

Moreover, there has been a

growing feeling that those who are poor are not wicked and
depraved, but merely people who should be given help in
reaching the good life.

In part this has been derived from

the fact that many poor people are Negroes, and their
situation is the result of the shocking long-term discrimina
tion that has deprived them their rights as men and citizens.
However many poor people there are, they are hard to
gather into a single organization so that an organization r
like OEO can deal with their problems systematically or
effectively.

The poor are diverse and their problems go

beyond the simple lack of money.

Included in their ranks

are blacks, unemployed old pensioners, dependent children,
tuberculous coal miners, school dropouts arid migratory
workers« The poor are ail around us, yet hard to locate
and harder still to organize.

Pluralism is as true of the

poor as it is of the rest of America.
The poor are hindered by the very problems from
which they are trying to escape.
efficacy.

They have a low sense of

They lack the skill of associating for common

l!
'Harrington, The Other America, pp. 1-59* All other
references to the exact dimensions of poverty, such as they
are, are extracted from Harrington. Of most importance to
our theme, perhaps, is the statement that, 15the poor are
invisible, n politically, for the res,son that they do not
belong to traditional organizations with power such as
labor unions, because they are unemployed. Thus they have
no way of using the steady pressure that characterizes the
activities of successful pressure groups in Washington.

purposes*

Many are illiterate and thus unable to write to

their congressman.

Their very illness, isolation, and.

depression turns them away from politics as a means of
salvation.

Thus OEO, or any other organisation attempting

to help the poor (and there is seemingly no argument over
the moral worthiness of this goal) will have self-defeating
problems.

Even though, one can mobilize some of the poor

by giving them a voice in local group discussion, the
actual base of support for OEO is small and relatively
ineffective.
The most visible demonstrations against poverty
have been inextricably connected with problems of racial
discrimination, as in the 1965 March on Washington and the
1968 Poor Peoples1 Campaign.

These demonstrations, have,

however, been sporadic, largely unrelated to OEO programs,
and have carried with them the additional hazard of
creating a serious reaction to all antipoverty efforts.
The demonstrations have concentrated on obtaining "here
and now'1 benefits such as additional food and jobs for the
indigent.

There has been violence, and the most recent

demonstrations, which have included demands for "repara
tions" for abuses from established churches, have inspired
fear on the part of many citizens, who might otherwise be
in sympathy with the legitimate goals of poor people.
The fact that OEO has been compelled to. work with
such a clientele end to include them in its operations has

meant that it has not always been able to present a model of
efficient and honest administration to Congress,,

This has

hurt it in dealing with legislators.
As has been previously indicated,-'

OEO1s critics

have faulted it chiefly for its slipshod management
practices.

They point to duplication of effort that they

consider wasteful.

For instance, Mrs, Edith Green, Congress*

woman from Oregon, pointed out that in Pittsburgh a year of
HEADSTART cost 580 dollars, while a year of a similar pro
gram, funded under the rubrics of the Elementary Education
Act costs but 250 dollars.^

HEADSTART costs for the same ,

type of program have been far from uniform.

Other critics

have suggested that OEO was established for the sole purpose
of gaining support in the 1964 elections*^

The facts seem

to indicate that OEO was established to operate by delega
cy

tion and in doing so serve as a goad to other agencies.
Nevertheless, there has been wide dispersion of antipoverty
effort within the federal government, and it has not all
been, desirable.

-43ee again Chapter Four, note 55 .
6
,
Hearings. Education and labor, p. 2749.
^"Congress and The Johnson Antipoverty Program,”
Congress1onal Divest, March 1966, Vol. 45, p. 89 .
^Levine, ^Program Budgeting For An InterAgency
Program,” p. 4. .And also Review of Economic Opportunity
Programs. p. 17.

A great amount of this dispersion has been caused
by the fa,ct that there has never been clea,r agreement about
whether OEO was to be an operating agency, with power to
fund programs directly or merely a coordinating agency with
Q
slight fiscal power.
In arriving at a structure for OEO,
a compromise was reached*

The responsibility for some

programs was vested in old established agencies such as
the Department of labor, with the expertise and personnel
to operate effectively in a given area®

Other programs,

such as the more visible HEADSTART and JOB CORPS were left
in OEO to give it financial leverage.*1*0
The dispersion of antipoverty efforts has been
accomplished in a number of ways.

The original Economic

Opportunity Act, for instance, called for OEO to operate
a :Work/Study program so that needy college students could
continue their education.

The 1965 Higher Education Act,

signed Into law shortly thereafter, transferred this
responsibility to the Office of Education In The Department
11

of Health, Education and Welfare.

A more common practice, however, has been to delegate

°Ben Seligman, '’Poverty and Power,n in Aspects of
Poverty ed, by Ben Seligman (New York: Crowell, 1968},

10Ibid*
11
‘to Act to Provide an Improved Economic Opportunity

the responsibility for prograin operation to other agencies*
In this fashion, 0E0, recognizing that it has neither the
talent nor the personnel required to conduct a given pro
gram, transfers the operational responsibility for it to
a pre-existing organ of national, state or local govern
ment*

This means that the delegate agency, such as the

Department of labor or the Richmond Public School System,
will conduct a program and make evaluations jointly with
OEOf12' The agency will receive s, transfer of funds from
0E0 and, as is the case with CEP, contract with a local
business man to operate the program * The CAA in the area 1
will usually establish a policy advisory group to maintain
some control over the venture* lb
^
The evidence about the delegation of programs for
fiscal 1968 indicates that a total of 1 *771*1 billion
dollars was appropriated to 0E0, and that of this, 5^5•6
million dollars was spent in programs outside 0E0.

Should

we assume that funding levels remain constant, the total
dollar amount to be administered by agencies outside 0E0
will increase by nearly 600 million dollars, when HEADSTART
arid JOB CORPS are transferred to The Department of Health,
Education and Welfare and the Department of Labor

12

“ Hearings, Appropriations, p« 123*
^‘ulnt erview 9 Chil es*
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respectively* Ir
At both the national and the local levels, the
dispersion of funding authority and operational responsi
bility has proven troublesome and fascinating.

certain

In

cases, administrators do not know the source of their
funding15
~ for ongoing programs. The local leader learns,
too, that there is more than one way to attain a desired
objective.

The RCAP assistant director observed that

during the 1969 Prefunding Review, the need and enthusiasm
for a legal services component for RCAP was demonstrated.
The agency was told, however, that there was "no money"
for such a venture.

However, several months later, after

a telephone call from Washington, the agency applied for
a CEP, a prominent feature of which will be a legal
services branch.

1

What we confront is an. agency that has

administratively been given the responsibility for over
coming a social problem of spectacular proportions, but has
never been given the power to carry out its responsibilities.
Given the broad fragmentation of funding authority, one
might very well ask who is really in charge of 0E0
operations *
There is the closely related problem of honesty of
3k

‘ R e v ie w
lb

o f E c o n o m ic

O p p o r tu n it y P ro g ra m s ,

^ H e a r in g s , A p p r o p r ia tio n s

16 Interview, Chiles.

* p. It3.

p. 2o.
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operations with which 0E0 must deal.

There have been highly

visible administrative "foul-ups" that have involved
criminal acts, associated 'with 0E0 operations.

The most

notorious has been the affair in which the 0E0 funded an
experimental program in which "classes" were "taught" by
members of the Blackstone Hangers, a juvenile gang.

How

ever, these are isolated and 0E0 leaders have been quick
to accept full responsibility for them.

They do not so

much show the criminal element in 0E0 as they show tbe
problems of a group who must deal at "arms length" with
local communities, on problems with a broadly-connected
theme, anti-poverty.

Moreover, such an incident tells us

little about the problem of demonstrating ordinary
effectiveness of a governmental agency, the crucial
17
problem under discussxon here.'"'
The most serious problem faced by GEO, or any other
e,gency dealing with this problem, would be to document its
usefulness, its raison d !etre on the Washington scene.
Here, the observor should consider some of the reasons
commonly cited for the establishment of GEO*

Here also

I"7
1Hearings,, Appropriations, p. 38. Here the remarks
of Congressman Natcher are pertinent. He said to Acting
Director Bertrand Harding, As the new Director of this
organisation, if you will pull this program together, con
vince the people in this country that you are spending the
money right /sic_7 and producing results, you will have no
trouble with this committee and you will have no trouble
viith conp<ress."

one must be exceedingly careful. For citizens can commonly
agree on the moral necessity for ’’doing something about the
poor,5’ but they are not in agreement about nwhat55 to do, how
it should be done, or what in fact has been accomplished*
A common argument to support the forming of 0E0 is
that by establishing such a new agency, "fresh approaches”
to the operation of social resource development programs
would develop*

Specific evidence to demonstrate that 0E0

has met this goal is hard to establish.

The Headmaster of

Mount Herman School, where an 0E0 UPWARD BOUND program de
signed to prepare poor children for campus life was
established, was asked this precise question, in Education
and Labor hearings.

Could a child get more from UPWARD

BOUND or from a similar program, established by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare?

His answer was, 551 don*t
*1R
think 1 should comment, because I don *t know.1
At a later
point, however, he complimented 0E0 on its "fresh approaches”
to social problems.
Another contention has been that older welfare program
were not only inefficient, but that in doing a poor job they
tended to stigmatize citizens as shiftless and no-good.

0E0

programs, it was said, would give a hand up and not a hand
out, and in so doing would help people maintain their selfrespect.

It is difficult to tell whether this end has come

“jo

Hearings, Education and Labor, p. 1786 .
^ Hearings, Education and Labor, p. 1787 .
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about in precisely the manner envisaged

by

0E0 planners.

In

asking about the fiscal 1969 appropriations for the Concen
trated Employment Programs

(C E P S ),

Representative Bob Casey

of Texas cited the experience of a woman In his district
who needed on-the-job training in order to get a, job.
fell outside the Mtarget area” of the
rapidly losing hope.

CEP,

She

and she was

Who should he see, asked Casey, to

discover, "just what is going on in the Houston, Texas
area,15 so that he could help this lady? 20
'
A final related problem with earlier programs is
that clients formerly felt that the social worker was in
her office just to see that forms were properly filled out,
andthat she had nothing to do with the level of aid given
to the client. 21

Treatment of this sort is implicit in the

complaints of CAA officials whose applications for programs
have been turned down.

Prior to the use of the Grant

Application Process, no reasons were given.

Today1s explana

tion that there is no money does little to counter the effects
of hopes that have been needlessly raised.
Essentially, there are a number of reasons that PPBS
cannot be of more than limited utility in helping the
20

^

H e a r in g s , A p p r o p r ia t io n s

, p. 1A6.

21

S c o t t B r i a r , "R a c e P o v e r t y a n d th e L a w ," i n A s p e c ts
o f P o v e r t y e d . b y B e n S e lig m a n (N e w Y o r k :
C r o w e ll, i9 6 0 )

p. 228 .
22

'H e a r i n g s ,

E d u c a t io n

and L a b o r, p .

1699*
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is
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in f o r m a t io n
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work.
This is for the good reason that such information
does not, and cannot, exist.
a

s u p p le m e n t

The County and City Data Book,

to the Census that is updated only every ten

years, shows that In 1960, 5156 families, or 24.5 percent
of the total Richmond families had incomes of less than
5000 dollars. '

No further information is available, and

even if It were, there would be no way to attribute moving
across the poverty line to the activities of any one
agency.

Thus the Richmond News-Leader could, as it did on .
^ In te r v ie w ,

24U . S . ,

C h ile s .

D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m e rc e ,
C o u n t y a n d C i t y D a t a B o o k ( W a s h in g t o n :
O f f i c e , 1967), p. 555-

B u re a u o f th e C e n s u s ,
G o v e rn m e n t P r i n t i n g

May 8, i969s s.sk, "what has it accomplished to date--really
PE

accomplished?" ^

This is a hard question to answer, and

this is confirmed by 0E0 officials, who in 1969 appropria
tions hearings, asked for three million dollars to have
a

"one-to-one" study of "what happens" to

grad.us.tes *

JO B CORPS

The General Accounting Office (GAO ), in its

study of 0E0 operations, put the whole situation quite
well holding,
, . . the methods of evaluating social programs such as
these and the indicators of progress are not welldeveloped or understood* . . as the scope of government
activity broadens and the complexity of programs in
creases, the Congress is confronted with the necessity
of appraising accomplishments^ that cannot be measured
-■> in terms of dollars expended,27
In making this statement,

GAO

clarifies the issue to

which citizens have given too little consideration; if we
are.to engage in a social resource development •program, we
must be more willing to accept the problems of clientele,
efficiency and reputation with which

QEO

has been confronted.

In short, we mu fit learn to "live with" the uncertainty in
herent in the War on Poverty and, even if we were to dis
cover that

CEO

operations were not "cost-effective," it

would not detract from the moral necessity for solution of
this diverse and urgent social problem.
^Editorial, The Richmond News-Leader* May 8, 1969•
26
Hearings, Appropriations* p , 167 *
27Revnew
.
of Economic Opportunity Programs, p, 2.

CHAPTER VI
A FEW FINAL WORDS
In this essay, the subject under discussion has been
the application of a 11rational1' resource allocation method
to the planning end execution of a social resource
development agency of the Federal Government.
Unfortunately, this type of budgeting, which many
have considered superior to either the line item approach '
or the incremental approach, is not invulnerable.

The

claim for its accuracy in predicting benefits cannot be
sustained, because there are practical and theoretical
difficulties in determining the Incidence of benefit, even
should we be able to agree on goals to be sought.

This is

particularly true in an 0E0 program where the benefits must
have some current relevancy, but are also to be considered
in terras of long-range effects.

Recent overruns in the

Defense Department procurement activities indicate that
difficulties with program budgeting are widespread.
The redeeming virtue of PPBS is not that it can
demonstrate results, but that It can help us to gain
clarity about the problems we face.

With PPBS, the un

certainty Inherent in government programs will not go away,
but we are forced to consider the broad goals of given

73

policies and programs and to make relevant comparisons with
other possible courses of action.

In the end, however, we

must realize, and accept, the fact that every budget is an
act of political faith.

What we can ask is that with the

antipoverty program, we accept the risks involved in this
unprecedented, unique and urgently required effort.

This

will require an act of political faith on our part, for no
system of budgeting will be able to demonstrate conclusive
results in an area so complex and difficult as that involved
in the elimination of poverty in America.
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INTERVIEWS

Mr. Louis Bailey, Field Representative for Richmond, Virginia,
Office of Economic Opportunity, Interview held in
Washington, B.C., October, 1968.
Mr, John Chiles, Assistant Director for Supportive Services,
Richmond Community Action Program, Interview held In.
Richmond, Virginia, November and March, 1969 <
•
Mr. Joe Fleming, Fulton Bottom Center Director, Richmond
Community Action Program, Interview held in Richmond,
Virginia, May, 1968.
Mr. Harry J . Hailey, Assistant Director of Office of Economic
Opportunity Research, Plans, Programming and Evalua
tion, Interview held In Washington, D.C., September
and October 1968.
Mr. John Howley, Deputy District Director, Mid Atlantic
Region Office of Economic Opportunity, Interview
held in Washington, D.C., October, 1968.
Mr. Paul Royston, Assistant Administrator for Community
Action Programs, Office of Economic Opportunity,
Interview held in Washington, D.C., October, 1968.
Mr. Frank Rupp, Management Information Specialist, Office of
Economic Opportunity, Interview held in Washington,
D.C., October, 1968.
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